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A.
C. P. A., SEC. 211a.
HEN section 211a of the Civil Practice Act was enacted by the legislature,' a great mystery was propounded to bench and bar. An Houdini could not have conjured up a reality more tantalizing to the rational mind.
There it was and is, unannounced, unheralded, unexplained.
Its origin is unknown; its purpose obscure; its very phraseology involved in contradictions of settled conceptions.
Though much has been written about it, it is striking that
no judge and no court has considered or discussed its metamorphosis, though this is the standard approach in the interpretation of any new statute. Painstaking search fails
to reveal any trace of its conception. It is like an illegitimate
child-to be accepted as a fact; its origin a subject of some
embarrassment.
That legislation can thus be thrust upon us, without
explanation of any kind, is indeed an indictment of the entire system of enacting law, both substantive and procedural.
But the present problem is not whence this statute came,
but what to do with it. Yet, to know something of its origin,
something of the setting in which it was conceived, would
W

'L. 1928, c. 714.
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undoubtedly point to its proper interpretation. The presumption of legitimacy is indeed strong and powerful; yet
reason requires that some plausibility there must be.
It is in this spirit that we present this record of our
uncharted course, for we are not certain that we have our
bearings, nor that we have correctly estimated the port of
origin or of destination of this most perplexing statute. With
no land in sight and neither the sun nor the moon nor the
stars to guide us, it should not be at all surprising if we
wandered and lost our way.
Yet we have observed bits of flotsam and jetsam which,
to the watchful and eager wayfarer, gives hope that safe port
is at hand. As an hypothesis, therefore, to be disowned
even by us if future soundings require it, we venture to reflect the entries in our log. Our own first impressions we
have had to modify, though we have only changed the reasons
and still cling-we hope not too stubbornly-to our original
conclusions. 2 Perhaps the process must still go on.
By way of introduction, it is well to have the new statute
before us:
"211a. Action by one joint tort-feasor against
another.
Where a money judgment has been recovered
jointly against two or more defendants in an action
for a personal injury or for property damage, and
such judgment has been paid in part or in full by one
or more of such defendants, each defendant who has
paid more than his own pro rata share shall be entitled to contribution from the other defendants with
respect to the excess so paid over and above the pro
rata share of the defendant or defendants making
such payment; provided, however, that no defendant
shall be compelled to pay to any other such defendant
an amount greater than his pro rata share of the entire
judgment. Such recovery may be had in a separate
action; or where the parties have appeared in the
original action, a judgment may be entered by one
such defendant against the other by motion on notice."
2

Rothschild, The Consolidated Action (1929) IV ST.

JOHN'S

L. REv., 151.
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It will be observed that this section is headed, in the
Civil Practice Act, not "contribution" between tort-feasors,
but "Action by one joint tort-feasor against another." Judging by the title alone, there was no attempt to promulgate
a new rule of substantive law, and one should not expect it
in a procedural statute. And the language of the statute
is such that it suggests the strong possibility that the substantive rule of contribution is to be found elsewhere. It
provides that where a joint judgment has been obtained
against tort-feasors, and one has paid the judgment in whole
or in part, he may recover such excess which he had paid
above his "pro ratashare" from the other tort-feasors against
whom joint judgment was rendered, by motion in the action,
or in a separate action. The impression is rather striking
that the statute provides a procedural method for expeditious disposition of a claim for contribution, the right to
which is assumed, rather than that it promulgates a rule permitting contribution between tort-feasors for the first time.
For what is the "pro rata share" of a joint tort-feasor? Is
he not liable for the whole judgment, and in the absence of
any assumption that there is any right to contribution between joint tort-feasors, as in the case of joint, several or
joint and several obligors, does the expression "pro rata
share" have any proper significance at all?
Furthermore, does the statute abolish the well settled
distinction between tort-feasors in pari delicto and all others,
so that, whereas under our former law a joint tort-feasor
could recover the whole amount from another, where the fault
was solely that other's, he can now recover only one-half? 3
It seems apparent that section 211a, in treating of the
right of contribution between tort-feasors against whom a
joint judgment has been rendered and paid by one of them,
describes the characteristics of the obligation in terms applicable only to joint, several, and joint and several contractual obligations. As to them, it is not a novel concept
but quite an accepted one, that each obligor is a principal as
to his pro ratashare, and surety as to the balance. But this
proceeds on the assumption of an underlying obligation of
'Oceanic

Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantic Espagnola,

134 N. Y. 461, 31 N. E. 987 (1892).
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contribution.

There was no such thing as contribution be-

tween tort-feasors in pari delicto.4

There was only indem-

nity of those responsible to the others. 5 Is there now not
only "contribution" between tort-feasors in pari delicto, but
also only contribution between tort-feasors who are not in
pari delicto, or may there still be complete indemnity of one
such as against the other? And what is it in any event that
measures a joint tort-feasor's pro rata share?
B.
ARTICLE 8, DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW.

In search for an answer to this question, we come upon
the new Article 8 of the Debtor and Creditor Law. We observe, in the first place, that it, like section 211a of the Civil
Practice Act, was also adopted in 1928. Chapter 833 of the
laws of that year ushered it in, whereas it was Chapter 714
of the laws of 1928 which introduced section 211a of the
Civil Practice Act. The Debtor and Creditor Law change
became effective on the date of its approval by the governor,
i.e., on April 6, 1928, whereas C. P. A. section 211a, though
approved earlier, on March 18, became effective only on September 1 of that year. Further, we know that the two statutes were concurrently considered, because the Debtor and
Creditor Law was the first to pass the Senate on March 12
while C. P. A. section 211a passed the Senate last on March
22; whereas in the Assembly it was C. P. A. section 211a
which passed first, i.e., on March 13, whereas the Debtor and
Creditor Law passed last, i.e., on March 21. We observe
next that, for the first time in this state, this statute formulating the rules for the "Discharge of Joint Obligors" specifically provides that "In this article, unless otherwise expressly stated, 'obligation' includes a liability in tort;
'obligor' includes a person liable for a tort; 'obligee' includes
a person having a right based on a tort. 'Several obligors'
means obligors severally bound for the same performance." 6
"WILLISTON,

5 Supra note

'N. Y.

CONTRACTS

3.

(1924) §345.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAw,

L. 1928, c. 833, §231.
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And this standard seems to be systematically carried out.
For in the case of the death of a joint obligor, the rule that
"his estate shall be bound as such jointly and severally with
the surviving obligor or obligors" is strictly limited to the
case of the death of "a joint obligor in contract," 7 for obviously the death of a tort-feasor, at least in personal injury
actions, ends his obligation.8
Finally, we know that the judicial mandate is that, if
possible, this statute should be read together with C. P. A.
section 211a:
"Statutes enacted at the same session of the legislature should receive a construction, if possible, which
will give effect to each. They are within the reason of
the rule governing the construction of statutes in palA
materia. Each is supposed to speak the mind of the
same legislature, and the words used in each should
be qualified and restricted, if necessary, in their construction and effect, so as to give validity and effect to
every other act passed at the same session.""S
"The rule that statutes in pari materia should be construed together applies with peculiar force to statutes
passed at the same session of the legislature; it is to
be presumed that such acts are imbued with the same
spirit and actuated by the same policy, and they are to
be construed together as if parts of the same act.
They should be so construed, if possible, as to harmonize, and force and effect should be given to the
provisions of each; if, however, they are necessarily
inconsistent, a statute which deals with the common
subject-matter in a minute and particular way will
prevail over one of a more general nature; and of two
inconsistent statutes enacted at the same session, that
will prevail which takes effect at the later date."Sb
7Ibid. §236.
a But, even here, the statute is not free from confusion, because in this
state, the death of a joint tort-feasor, guilty of property damage, does not
necessarily end his obligation (Mayer v. Ertheiler, 144 App. Div. 158, 128 N. Y.
Supp. 807 (1st Dept. 1911). But, perhaps, it was the object of the statute, in
section 236 to deal only with joint contracts, since a joint tort-feasor would in
reality be jointly and severally liable, and not merely jointly.
" Smith v. The People, 47 N. Y. 330, 339.
£ b39 Cyc. 1151.
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But even with this standard in mind, what is accomplished by the new Debtor and Creditor Law, or what was
intended, is not free from doubt.
Quite unlike section 211a, though adopted by the same
legislature, it has a known history and background. It is
one of the "uniform" laws promulgated as the "Uniform
Joint Obligations Act" by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It was drafted by Professor Williston and finally formulated in 1925. It is fair,
therefore, to look for its interpretation, or for suggestion as
to its purpose, to the monumental treatise of the author of
the statute, on the law of contracts. Indeed, in one of the
reports of the American Bar Association 9 the suggestion is
made that the common-law confusion which occasioned the
drafting of the statute might be found described in Professor
Williston's exposition of the subject in the Law of Contracts.
Indeed, the report 9a of the Reasons for the Adoption of the
Uniform Joint Obligations Act (Article 8 of our Debtor
and Creditor Law) is substantially a reprint of section 336
of Williston on Contracts.
Reference to Williston on Contracts shows that that
learned author treats of the joint obligations of tort-feasors
as based on the same principles as the contractual obligations
of joint debtors. So he says:
"The liability of two or more persons jointly concerned in committing a tort is joint and several; and,
for the same reason, as in the case of parties jointly
and severally liable in contract, a release of one discharges all. There seems also no reason of technical
principle to distinguish the effect of a covenant not
to sue or a release of one of several obligors under a
joint and several liability in tort with a reservation
of rights against the others from the effect of a similar
release given to a joint and several contractor, and
many decisions, accepting the analogy, permit an action to be maintained subsequently against the other
tort-feasors, where one jointly and severally liable
'Vol. 50 (1925) p. 588.
'aHandbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and Proceedings (1925).
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with them for the tort has been given a covenant not
to sue him or a qualified release." 10
No reference here to "judgment" as distinguished from
"liability."
As to contribution between joint debtors the learned
author had said in a previous section:
"Again it is said that other joint debtors are discharged because the right of contribution of the other
joint debtors against the one released would thereby
be wrongfully discharged, but, as has been pointed
out, no release by the creditor of one joint debtor
could affect the right of contribution belonging to the
other joint debtors. In so far as the joint debtors not
released are not principal debtors they necessarily
have a right of contribution or of indemnification
which cannot be taken away from them without their
consent." 11
So, in later treating of the effect of payment by one of
several debtors, no discrimination is made between joint
contract debtors and joint tort-feasors:
"But in the absence of a clear evidence of a contrary intention, where a creditor covenants not simply
for temporary forbearance, but permanently never to
sue one of several debtors, it should be presumed that
the payment made by that debtor in consideration for
the covenant is a payment on account of the debt, and
therefore to that extent the debt is discharged as to
all the debtors." 12
And significantly, in the footnote appended to this statement, cases involving joint tort-feasors are cited. So it is
said:
** In Nashville Interurban R. v. Gregory, 137
Tenn. 422,* * * the court, however, refused to request
20 WILLISTON,

Ibid. §333.

" Ibid. §341.

op. cit. supra note 4, §338 (a).
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a credit by the plaintiff in favor of the defendant of
a sum received from another joint tort-feasor in exchange for a covenant not to sue. The court somewhat confused the two distinct questions as to whether
a covenant not to sue extinguished the cause of action,
and whether a payment received for such a covenant
should be regarded as part payment on account of the
joint liability of the tort-feasors. It is expressly provided in some of the statutes referred to that credit
shall be given for payments by a joint debtor." 13
It should be noted that the New York law is in accord
1 4
with Professor Williston's criticism.
In shifting the point of view so as to observe the relationships of the co-debtors to each other, instead of their obligations merely to the creditor, still there is no discrimination
between joint tort-feasors and joint contractual debtors:
"The effect of a covenant not to sue one of several
co-debtors or of a release of one with a reservation of
rights against the others has been considered from
the aspects of a creditor. The same question may be
considered from the aspect of the debtor who has received the covenant or release; and it may be premised
that if the undischarged co-debtors are forced by any
means without their consent to pay more than their
share of the debt, they can in turn enforce a claim for
contribution against the debtor or debtors who received the covenant or qualified release." 15
Of the fact that our new Article 8 of the Debtor and
Creditor law is rooted in the philosophy of Professor Williston as thus stated, there can be no doubt. The very
phraseology of the statute shows its indebtedness to identical
authorship. The phrase "contract or relation" used in the
statute is the very one employed by Professor Williston:
"3Ibid. footnote 80.
"'Gaetjens v. New York, 145 App. Div. 640, 130 N. Y. Supp. 405 (1st
Dept. 1911); Knapp v. Roche, 94 N. Y. 329 (1884).
" Supra note 4, §342.
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"Though a creditor may exact full payment of
the whole debt, by levy of execution or otherwise, from
one only of those severally or jointly, or jointly and
severally, liable to him, and cannot be compelled to
confine his resort to each to that amount which as between one another each debtor ought to pay an obligor
who is compelled by the creditor to pay in excess of
the share, proper as between himself and his codebtors, is entitled to contribution or indemnification
from the other obligors according to his contract or
relation with them,. * * * As between obligors who
are equally interested or equally without interest the
duty to bear the burden is equal, and contribution
will be enforced in favor of one who has paid more
than his proportion against others who have paid less.
* * * It may be added finally to avoid misapprehension, that no right of contribution exists between joint
tort-feasors who are in par! delicto." 10
It will be observed that the word "relation" would certainly embrace the status of joint tort-feasors, and that Professor Williston expressly realizes this, for he takes care to
point out "that no right of contribution exists between joint
tort-feasors who are in pari delicto." This would seem to
express recognition, therefore, of the fact that his discussion
does embrace tort-feasors not in par! delicto.
There is therefore little doubt that Article 8 of the
Debtor and Creditor Law embraces and was intended to include the obligations of joint tort-feasors as well as of
joint debtors, at any rate, those joint tort-feasors not in pari
delicto. But since there undoubtedly was no right of contribution at common law between joint tort-feasors in par!
delicto, the question presented is indeed: a serious one as to
whether Professor Williston, who drafted the new statute
on Joint Obligations, intended to create the right of contribution as between joint tort-feasors, or whether, in this respect, he intended merely to reflect the common law, and
was led into unfortunately ambiguous phraseology by his
own theory that the fundamentals of joint obligations in tort
" Ibid. §345.
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and contract were the same. Assuming, as is not impossible
(though unlikely) from his discussion of the subject, that
he intended to create contribution between tort-feasors in
pari delicto as distinguished from indemnity between tortfeasors, not in pari deticto, the question is nevertheless a
serious one as to whether the legislature intended to and
did accomplish that purpose.
And at the outset it must be admitted to have striking
significance that nowhere in the discussions of the Conference of Uniform Laws is there a suggestion of any attempt
to create the right of contribution between joint tort-feasors
in pari delicto. Yet this is not decisive, because, in these
reports neither is there any trace of a purpose to embrace the
topic of indemnity between tort-feasors not in pari delicto.
Indeed, all the discussions reported are of little or no consequence-amazingly so, when it is remembered how complex
is the entire subject of joint obligations. Indeed, nowhere
have we been able to find, in the consideration of the statute
even a hint as to why tort-feasors as distinguished from
judgment-debtors (of. C. P. A., sec. 211a) who were tortfeasors, were expressly included within the scope of the
statute.
The new Article 8 of the Debtor and Creditor Law, in
a very able discussion of the subject, has been so construed
that it "does not deal with the creation of the relationship,
nor with the parties who may be joint obligors." In this
sense it has been said that "It deals solely with the rights
and liabilities of the parties after that relationship has been
created, or,. more particularly, it deals with the effect of
judgments, part payments, releases, and the death of a joint
obligor. * * *" Although the new Joint Obligations Act by
definition makes "obligation," "obligor" and "obligee" include tort rights and liabilities, it is questionable whether
17
the defenses of this section will be available in tort cases.
But this ignores the plain and express language of the
statute which for the first time brings the tort-feasor within
the category of joint obligors. And it will be noted that this
is a tort-feasor whose liability is not authenticated by a judgment against him. In order to be a joint obligor under this
'Note

(1928)

13 CoRN. L.

Q. 640.
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statute it is not necessary that his liability be merged in a
judgment which might be said to have contractual nature.'8
This surely is the creation in a very real sense of the relationship itself.
On the other hand, it is quite true that if the purpose
of the draftsman was to create the obligation of contribution
between tort-feasors in pari delicto, the phraseology used was
vague and inept. If it was the purpose of this statute to
settle problems, it may be fairly said of this one, as of many
others, that it more than compensated for all that it settled
by those which it raised anew. To us it seems that the
statute may be given operation-even with due respect to
the definition of joint obligors to include joint tortfeasors-if it be deemed only to regulate the obligations of
debtors (including tort-feasors), not as between themselves,
but only to the creditor.
So it may be said that all the statute accomplishes in
this respect is to state the rules as to the effect of a release
without reservations, or of one with reservations, and to give
a joint tort-feasor the benefit of any payment made by another joint tort-feasor. 19
Such an interpretation would make the statute largely
declaratory of existing law. But this is not a wholly satisfying result, because if it were not intended to completely assimilate the rules as to joint tort-feasors with those as to
joint debtors on the principle of contribution, much of the
statute as applied to tort-feasors is quite confused, if not
meaningless. So section 233 requires that the "amount or
value of any consideration received by the obligee (including of course a tort obligee) from one or more of * * *
obligors (including of course a joint tort-feasor) shall be
credited to the extent of the amount received on the obligations of all co-obligors to whom the obligor or obligors giving the consideration did not stand in the relation of surety."
This means nothing as to joint tort-feasors in pari delicto
unless we infer that as to them (by the fact of payment, and
A judgment, though predicated on a tort liability, may, for many purposes, be deemed a contract. This is quite settled. The rule has been applied
to judgments based on tort. Mecum v. Becker, 164 App. Div. 852, aff'd, 215
N. Y. 691, 109 N. E. 1084 (1915).
" Supra note 6, §§234, 235, 233.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

irrespective of the compulsion of any judgment), as in the
case of joint or joint and several obligors, there is the obligation of contribution so that for all in excess of the pro rata
share of each tort-feasor, he is a surety as distinguished from
a principal debtor. And it means as little with respect to
joint tort-feasors not in pari delicto, because in such case,
as we have seen,2 0 one is entitled, not merely to a pro rata
share, but to complete indemnity from the other, and the
relation is certainly not one which may be differentiated on
any principle of suretyship.
Similarly, sections 234 and 235 of the statute are as follows:
"234. Discharge of one obligor, with reservations. Subject to the provisions of section two hundred and thirty-three, the obligee's release or discharge, of one or more of several obligors, or of one
or more of joint, or of joint and several obligors shall
not discharge co-obligors, against whom the obligee
in writing and as part of the same transaction as the
release or discharge, expressly reserves his rights;
and in the absence of such a reservation of rights shall
discharge co-obligors only to the extent provided in
section two hundred and thirty-five.
"235. Discharge of one obligor, without reservations. (a) If an obligee releasing or discharging an
obligor without express reservation of rights against
a co-obligor, then knows or has reason to know that
the obligor released or discharged did not pay so much
of the claim as he was bound by his contract or relation with that co-obligor to pay, the obligee's claim
against that co-obligor shall be satisfied to the amount
which the obligee knew or had reason to know that the
released or discharged obligor was bound to such coobligor to pay.
(b) If an obligee so releasing or discharging an
obligor has not then such knowledge or reason to
know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor shall
-Supra note 3.
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be satisfied to the extent of the lesser of two amounts,
namely, (1) the amnount of the fractional share of the
obligor released or discharged, or (2) the amount that
such obligor was bound by his contract or relation
with the co-obligor to pay." (Italics ours.)
What can section 235 mean as to joint tort-feasors in
par!delicto if there is no right of contribution between them
irrespective of and prior to a joint judgment? Does a joint
tort-feasor in pari delicto "know (s) or have reason to know
that the obligor released or discharged did not pay so much
of the claim as he was bound by his contract or relation with
that co-obligor to pay?" If there is no general obligation
of contribution between tort-feasors in pari delicto (other
than created by a joint judgment), then such tort-feasor is
never bound to pay anything to his co-tort-feasor. But this
reasoning would completely nullify not only section 235, but
also section 234 as far as joint tort-feasors in pari delicto
are concerned, and moreover would make the definitions contained in section 231 (which have the express purpose of including joint tort-feasors) a perfectly meaningless collection
of mere words. Furthermore, even with respect to tortfeasors not in par delicto, the statute creates nothing but
confusion, because in such case there is no such concept as
that of a "pro rata share." In such case, it is complete indemnity or nothing.
The only escape from this reasoning is in the contention
that the statute, as we now have it, does not refer to tort
"liabilities"but judgments predicated on torts, thus interpreting Article 8 of the Debtor and Creditor Law (effective in
April, 1928) by the standard set by section 211a of the Civil
21
Practice Act (effective six months later i. e. in Septenber,
1928). Such was the construction of the old Debtor and
Creditor Law,22 and the old statute expressly provided, upon this assumption, that "An instrument making a composition with a creditor does not impair the creditor's right of
action against any other joint debtor, or his right to take any
' Yet the rotation of chapter numbers would be quite consistent for it was
chapter 714 which enacted C. P. A. section 211a and chapter 833 which enacted
article 8 of the DFBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW.
2-Supra note 18.
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proceeding against the latter; unless an intent to release or23
exonerate him, appears affirmatively upon the face thereof."
But this statute had not stipulated that joint debtors should
include joint tort-feasors. A joint tort-feasor became a debtor
only when judgment was rendered against him. Then the
distinction between tort-feasors in pari delicto and those not
in pari delicto did not confuse, because the statute dealt only
with the rights and obligations of a creditor with respect
to whom the statute made the distinction of no importance
because the creditor's state of knowledge (as in the present
statute) was not the test. "The foundation of the claim may
have been in tort, but the judgment created a joint debt to
which sections 230 to 233 of the Debtor and Creditor Law
(Consol. Laws, chap. 12; Laws of 1909, chap. 17) apply." 24
The present statute, however, does not refer to judgments,
but to "a liability in tort" or "a person liable for a tort" or
"person having a right based on a tort." 25
Indeed, it seems quite plain that the draftsman of the.
statute (irrespective of what may have been his intention)
reflected a set of rules without discrimination, in these respects, as between joint debtors and joint tort-feasors. For
when he means only joint contract debtors, he is careful to
note the limitation.2" Otherwise, as in his treatise, no discrimination is made. If he intended only to formulate rules
as between creditor, on the one hand, and debtors, on the
other, he became involved in the cross currents inevitably
created. To regulate and direct the rules obtaining as between the creditor and his debtors, inevitably resulted in
disturbing the relationship betiween the debtors themselves.
The argument is thus fairly worthy of consideration as
to whether it is not the new Article 8 of the Debtor and Creditor Law which supplies the standard of contribution between
joint tort-feasors. But strong doubt there nevertheless must
be because such was not the rule at common law, and we
should have expected plain language on such an important
' N. Y. Con. L., c. 12; Laws of 1909, c. 17, §231 of the old DBTOR
CREDiTOR LAW.

-' Scott, J. in Mecum case, supra note 18.
0 Supra note 6, §231.
' Supra note 6, §236.

AND
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change.2 7 But that the language is not unequivocal is not
conclusive as in many other instances in statutory construction. 28 For here, unless it was intended to create the rule
of contribution between joint tort-feasors, there is much in
the statute that is inept and inexplicable.
Statutes have been construed to be valid and coherent
with other statutory enactments on no more than is present
20
here.
We thus have the curious situation that by equally persuasive considerations, the Debtor and Creditor Law may or
may not be construed to imply the new right of contribution
between joint tort-feasors, depending upon the setting in
which it is found, and the purpose which it was sought to
accomplish. It would not be difficult to conclude that it was
intended to create contribution between joint tort-feasors.
It would be quite as simple to come to an opposite conclusion.
The task is to find the guide to decision.
C.
C. P. A., SECTION

211a, AND THE DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW.

It is in this light, then, and pursuant to the standard
set by our Court of Appeals, that we approach the more
careful consideration of section 211a:
"'In the exposition of statutes, the established
rule is that the intention of the law-maker is to be
deduced from a view of the whole statute, and every
material part of the same; and where there are several
statutes relating to the same subject, they are all to
be taken together, and one part compared with another in the construction of any one of the material
provisions, because, in the absence of contradictory
or inconsistent provisions, they are supposed to have
the same object and as pertaining to the same system.
'Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 111 N. E. 837 (1916); Hopkins v.
Lincoln Trust Co., 233 N. Y. 213, 135 N. E. 267 (1922).
'Matthews v. Matthews, 240 N. Y. 28, 147 N. E. 237 (1925).

2'Ibid.
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Resort may be had to every part of a statute, or, where
there is more than one in pari materia, to the whole
system, for the purpose of collecting the legislative
intention, which is the iinportant inquiry in all cases
where provisions are ambiguous or inconsistent
(Kohlsaat v. Murphy, 96 U. S. 153, 159; New Lamp
Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U. S.
656, 662.)" Matthews v. Matthews.30
We doubt that it is a mere accident that section 211a
was adopted by the same legislature which adopted the new
Article 8 of the Debtor and Creditor Law. Common impulse
there must have been and was, which gave rise to both, but
which the cause and which the result, which the foundation
and .which the superstructure, is the problem to be determined. The question is as to whether Civil Practice Act section 211a was intended to be a procedural supplement to
Article 8 of the Debtor and Creditor Law, or a new rule of
substantive law, resting upon or collateral to Article 8 of
the Debtor and Creditor Law, and incorporated in the Civil
Practice Act for want of choice of a more appropriate resting place.
If it can be read as a procedural supplement to that
statute, it would be the more desirable result and more in
accord with the normal standard of statutory construction.
We may even grant, from this point of view, that when the
legislature adopted section 211a, it may have misread and
misinterpreted the effect of Article 8 of the Debtor and
Creditor Law, in supposing that it introduced the principle of contribution generally. A uniform law, thus transplanted to a new setting, would take on a new meaning,
otherwise unjustified. In such case, the effect would be correctly to interpret section 211a as a supplement to Article 8
of the Debtor and Creditor Law, though, without section
211a, Article 8 of the Debtor and Creditor Law would take
on no such meaning. But this would be sound statutory construction, for whether or not predicated on an erroneous assumption of the meaning of Article 8 of the Debtor and
Creditor Law, such a conclusion would, nevertheless, repreIbid. at 35, 147 N E. at 238.
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sent the intention of the legislature, fallacious and unfortunate though it may have been. It is not sound principle,
nor infallible construction of an unrelated statute, which
we seek, but the intention of the legislature, as gathered
from its enactments in related settings, whether we like it
or understand it or not.
So viewed, section 211a of the Civil Practice Act illumines Article 8 of the Debtor and Creditor Law and the
said provisions of that law enlighten us on the proper interpretation of section 211a.
It is quite true, however, that reading section 211a
alone, in the light of the old Debtor and Creditor Law, which
considered a joint tort-feasor a joint debtor only when he had
been cast in judgment so that then he might be responsible
for "his ratable portion of the joint debt," 31 "his own pro
rata share" to his joint tort-feasors as described in section
211a might well be his proportion of the liability as fixed
by the judgment, though there was no liability to them before judgment. But, read in the light of the new Debtor and
Creditor Law which refers to "so much of the claim as he
was bound by his contract or relation with that co-obligor
to pay," 32 it is impossible to come to such conclusion, because by the express words of the statute it is the "contract
or relation," and not any judgment entered thereon, which
fixes the liability of one obligor to another.
So interpreted, section 211a of the Civil Practice Act
is the procedural supplement to the new Article 8 of the
Debtor and Creditor Law, and this is consistent -with its
being placed in the Civil Practice Act instead of in the
Debtor and Creditor Law. So read in the light of the Debtor
and Creditor Law, it does not provide that there is and can
be no contribution except where the joint tort-feasors have
had a joint judgment rendered against them, and one of
them has paid more than his pro rata share, but that in a
case where it so happens that a joint judgment has been rendered, and that one of the tort-feasors has paid more than
his pro rata share, he may have relief by way of motion in
the original action if all the tort-feasors have appeared, and
Supra note 23, §233.
Supra note 6, §235.
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is not necessarily relegated to an independent action, unless
they have not all appeared. This interpretation would give
both section 211a and the new Article 8 of the Debtor and
Creditor Law full meaning, whereas, interpreted as permitting contribution only as between joint tort-feasors against
whom a joint judgment has been entered, it renders section
211a harsh, arbitrary and discriminatory, 33 and the Debtor
and Creditor Law an amazing example of statutory ineptness.
Nor is this view as radical as may appear at first blush,
for it is strengthened by a consideration of the basis of the
rule of contribution, which makes it entirely unlikely that
contribution would ever be sought, except by one who found
himself with a joint judgment against him, which he has
been compelled to pay. Even as among joint, several, or
joint and several contract obligors, the right to contribution
does not accrue until the obligor has made payment. 34 No
less, then, should or can be the standard for the accrual of
the right of contribution on the part of an obligor who is
a joint tort-feasor. But, in his case it is only a judgment
which can irrevocably fix the amount of his obligation, unliquidated until that event, whereas the contract joint debtor
has a measure of his liability by the agreement of himself
and his co-obligor with the obligee.3 5 It follows, therefore,
a-q a practical matter, that a joint tort-feasor, though he
makes payment (without the compulsion of a judgment) has
no way of fixing his ratable share except through a judgment
taken against him. Therefore, it is not likely that he will
be in a position to ask for his ratable contribution by motion
in an action except where the obligation itself has been liquidated by a judgment taken jointly against himself and his
co-tort-feasors.
Indeed, it is quite settled that a judgment against one
of two joint tort-feasors, where the other is not a party, is
not res judicata in a new action commenced against the
'Supra

note 17 (footnote).

Fitch v. Fraser, 109 App. Div. 440, aff'd, 188 N. Y. 605, 81 N. E. 1164
(1907) ; Lee v. Larkin, 125 App. Div. 302, 109 N. Y. Supp. 480 (3d Dept. 1908).
' WILLISTON, op. cit. smipra note 4, §345.
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other.3 6 Procedure by motion would, therefore, be quite inappropriate, except where a joint judgment has been rendered and the joint obligation, therefore, adjudicated. In
other words, the likelihood is almost nil that a joint tortfeasor will find it necessary to ask for contribution, except
where judgment has been rendered against him alone-a
result which in practically every case he could avoid, by
bringing in his co-tort-feasor as a joint defendant-which, in
most instances, means joint judgment against himself and
co-tort-feasors, if we may presume that a plaintiff would not
deliberately forego a source of satisfaction of his judgment.
D.
SuBDIVISION 2 OF C. P. A., SEC. 193.
Before we proceed further, it is now necessary to consider the procedural method of bringing in a joint tortfeasor, where plaintiff has omitted to sue him. This statute
is subdivision 2 of section 193 of the Civil Practice Act,
which is now the battlefield upon which the issue of the
proper interpretation of section 211a is being fought. The.
statute is as follows:
"2. Where any party to an action shows that
some third person, not then a party to the action, is
or will be liable to such party wholly or in part for
the claim made against such party in the action, the
court, on application of such party, may order such
person to be brought in as a party to the action and
direct that a supplemental summons and a pleading
alleging the claim of such party against such person
be served upon such person and that such person plead
thereto, so that the claim of such moving party
against such person may be determined in such action, which shall thereupon proceed against such perOld Dominion Copper Mining Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E.

193, aff'd 225 U. S. 111, 32 Sup. Ct. 641 (1911); Tanzer v. Breen, 131 App.
Div. 654, 116 N. Y. Supp. 110 (1st Dept. 1909).
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son as a defendant therein to such judgment as may
be proper." 36a
It will be observed that before this statute can apply it
is necessary that "some third person * * * is or will be liable
to such party (in this case, the defendant) wholly or in part"
for the claim made against that defendant in the action.
Taking this statute literally and supplying nothing by inference, it is plain that if there is no independent obligation
of contribution between joint tort-feasors, there is and can
be no authority for the granting of any motion made by one
tort-feasor to bring in another as a party defendant, for
there is no possibility under any known rule of law that a
tort-feasor not a defendant "is or will be liable" to defendant.
On the other hand, if there is an independent obligation
of contribution, clearly the joint tort-feasor not already a
party to the action "is or will be liable" to defendant. Assuming, therefore, that there is no independent substantive
rule of contribution between tort-feasors, it thus becomes
necessary, if we would employ this statute, to read into it
by implication that it is enough that the third person "is
or will be liable" to defendant, if said third person is
made a defendant. In this fashion, a substantive right is
created by the procedural device of bringing in additional
parties. This is a rather startling result, to say the least,
i.e., that a merely procedural device should create a substantive right. Yet this is exactly what has thus far occurred,
for in the Fourth, Third and First departments it has been
held that a joint tort-feasor may be brought in by a defendant for the very purpose of enabling the defendant to obtain
contribution from his co-tort-feasors. 37 The rationale of
these cases is stated in the able opinion of Mr. Justice
Crouch in the Haines case:
'a

CIVIL PRACTcE AcT §193, subd. 2.

'Haines v. Bero, 230 App. Div. 332, 243 N. Y.
1930) ; Schenck v. Bradshaw, 251 N. Y. Supp. 316 (3d
Hank & Schmidt, 232 App. Div. 556, 250 N. Y. Supp.
decisions to the contrary, e.g., Troshow v. B. Altman &
at Special Term, N. Y. County, 140 Misc. 420, 250 N.
must be deemed overruled.

Supp. 657 (4th Dept.
Dept. 1931) ; Davis v.
537 (lst Dept. 1931);
Co. (Frankenthaler,J.,
Y. Supp. 599 (1931)),
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"The legislative purpose in the enactment of section 211a was to modify the ancient rule of law (see
Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns Ch. 131), under which there
was no contribution between joint tort-feasors who
were in pari delicto. We may assume, perhaps, that
to the more tolerant modern mind the morality of
that old doctrine seemed too stark and austere to be
just. Mercy there may be even to a wrongdoer. The
statute grants a substantial right. It was not intended, we think, that the opportunity of a defendant
to utilize that right should depend solely upon the
will of a plaintiff; nor should the courts thwart the
legislative purpose by narrow interpretation of a
practice rule nor by the use of a discretion too restricted in scope."' 38
Neither this case nor any other considers the concurrent
amendment of the Debtor and Creditor Law.
A contrary view, i.e., that a defendant tort-feasor may
not avail himself of subdivision 2 of section 193, has been
taken only by courts at Special Term. Their view is, as
put by Mr. Justice Frankenthaler in a recent case, that the
Haines case "appears to overlook the fact that a joint judgment against both defendants, may not be had unless the
plaintiff elects to demand it, which he may not be ordered
to do without his consent."' 39 But this criticism itself involves error, for it is quite settled that even if a third person
be brought in on defendant's motion, pursuant to subdivision
2 of section 193, no joint judgment in favor of plaintiff
against defendant and the impleaded party results, but only
a separate judgment of defendant against said impleaded
third person. 40 For that reason, it is difficult to see how
the criticism just stated is appropriate, for plaintiff is not
thus made a litigant against the impleaded tort-feasor.
There would seem to be similar error involved in the recent
' Haines v. Bero, supra note 37, at 334, 335, 243 N. Y. Supp. 658.
=' Troshow v. B. Altman & Co., supra note 37.
"Bozzuffi v. Darrieusecq, 125 Misc. 178, 210 N. Y. Supp. 455 (1st
Dept. 1925); Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller, 127 Misc. 421, 216 N. Y. Supp. 320
(1st Dept. 1926). The Bozzuffi case was referred to with approval in Haines
v. Bero Engineering Const. Co., 230 App. Div. 332, 243 N. Y. Supp. 657 (4th
Dept. 1930).
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decision at Special Term, Westchester County, denying an
application made under subdivision 2 of section 193, because
in such case "plaintiff thereby necessarily receives a money
judgment contrary to his wish * * * ,41
Plaintiff obtains no money judgment against the impleaded tort-feasor.
While the criticism thus made by some courts on the
ground that plaintiff cannot be coerced into receiving a judgment against a tort-feasor whom he did not sue, would not
seem to be sound, yet it is quite clear that, even if subdivision 2 of section 193 be employed, a "joint judgment," in
the usual sense, there cannot be. Obviously, a judgment of
plaintiff against defendant, and of defendant in turn against
another tort-feasor, is not a "joint judgment" of plaintiff
against defendant and his co-tort-feasor as that phrase is
normally understood. "Joint judgment" under C. P. A.,
sec. 211a, must, therefore, be deemed to contemplate even
separate judgments providing they result after a joint trial.
While this is certainly a strained construction, it is not at
all impossible that the legislature so intended, if we apply
the functional standards now employed under the new rules
as to joinder of parties generally. 42 Such is the plain intimation of the Haines case, which justifies its decision to bring
in the joint tort-feasor "so that the finding may eventuate in
a joint judgment." 4
Similarly, the criticisms in the Wrestchester County
Court case, levelled against the decision of the Appellate Division of the Fourth Department in Fox v. Western N. Y.
Motor Lines, 43 a would seem to be unjustified. The effect of
the Fox case and the criticism made of it may be gathered
from the following quotation from the Rothman case.
"In the Haines case (supra) the court said (p.
661) : 'It was not intended, we think, that the oppor'Coyle,

J., in Rothman v. Byron, County Court, Westchester County,

N. Y. L. J., Oct. 30, 1931.
C. P. A. §211. It is enough that there are common questions of law or

fact. Akely v. Kinnicut, 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682 (1924); Ader v. Blau,
241 N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771 (1925); Sherlock v. Manwaren, 208 App. Div.
538, 203 N. Y. Supp. 709 (4th Dept. 1924).
' Haines v. Bero, supra note 37, at 333, 334, 243 N. Y. Supp. at 657, citing
Sherlock v. Manwaren, supra note 42.
,a 232 App. Div. 308, 249 N. Y. Supp. 623 (4th Dept. 1931).
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tunity of a defendant to utilize that right should depend solely upon the will of a plaintiff.'
In reasoning thus the learned court led itself into an entirely different situation, which was later presented in the Fox case (supra). There the plaintiff
had executed a conditional release of one of two joint
tort-feasors for a valid consideration. In other words,
he had settled his claim against the one and brought
suit against the other. The defendant thereupon
brought in and made a party defendant the man with
whom the plaintiff had settled and to whom the plaintiff had given a release. The learned court was then
compelled to hold that the release was ineffective to
prevent the defendant from bringing in the released
party for the purpose of recovering from him his pro
rata share of any judgment that might be rendered,
and this despite the fact that the plaintiff thereby
necessarily receives a money judgment contrary to his
wish and against a person whom he has released. The
effect of such an interpretation of section 211a will be
to prevent the settlement of claims for personal injuries or property damage wherever there is any other
person or persons against whom, by any stretch of the
imagination, the plaintiff might make a claim. No defendant could ever buy his peace and accept a conditional release. It would be unsafe for him to do so.
And this, it seems to me, is contrary to public' po44
icy.",
But it has always been quite settled that no act of the
creditor could in any way affect the rights of contribution
between the debtors. 45 Even the old Debtor and Creditor
Law so expressly provided. 40 There is nothing in these conclusions which can be said to be against public policy. Indeed, section 233 of the present statute expressly provides
uSupra note 41.
WILLISTON,

"Supra

op. cit. supra note 4, §342.

note 23, DEBTOR

AND CREDITOR LAW (old) §233: "A joint debtor,
including a partner, who has not compounded may require the compounding
debtor to contribute his ratable portion of the joint debt, or of the partnership
debts, as the case may be, as if the latter had not been discharged."
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that the co-obligor who has not compounded shall receive
the benefit of the payment made by the obligor upon that
portion of the liability as to which the co-obligor was liable
as principal (not as surety). If this be just as to contractual
joint obligors, it is quite as just with respect to joint tortfeasors. In any event, whatever may be thought of the general right of contribution, the statute is plain enough in
embracing tort-feasors within the principle that no joint tortfeasor can arrogate to his sole benefit any settlement which
he has made. If it were otherwise, joint contractors would
no longer be beneficiaries of this rule either, for no distinction is made in the statute between contract and tort
obligors. But such a thought is not possible.
Indeed, Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines 46a distinctly shows the dawning of judicial recognition, that section 211a of the Civil Practice Act is not an isolated statute,
but must be read in the light of the new amendment to
Article 8 of the Debtor and Creditor Law, for, in this case,
we find specific reference to the Debtor and Creditor Law,
and an express approval of identical treatment of joint
obligations in tort with that accorded to joint obligations
in contract. It is with a true appreciation of the inevitable
effect of section 211a, that Sears, P. J., says:
"When a joint tort occurs, a right of contribution
among the joint tort-feasors arises forthwith, under
the provisions of section 211a, Civil Practice Act, as
we construe it, despite its procedural language, but
the right, as we said above, is inchoate. It is, none
the less, real and subsisting. It is incident, in a
sense, to the injured person's right of recovery." 46b
Inspired gropings are these, undoubtedly prompted by
a delicately attuned judicial instinct searching for the elusive substantive law change which created the right of contribution among tort-feasors not in pari delicto.
16a Flenner v. Southwest Mo. R. R. Co., 221 Mo. App. 160, 290 S. W.
78 (1927), referred to in the opinion, is not analogous. It is like Price v. Ryan
herein discussed. Furthermore, as far as we know, the UNIFORIM JOINT
See also note 55 infra.
O-LIGATIONS AcT has not been enacted in Missouri.
16b Supra note 43a, at 312, 249 N. Y. Supp. at 628.
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The final criticism levelled at the Haines case, again in
the Westchester County Court opinion, is that:
"Then, too, if section 211a does confer a substantive right of contribution 'when a joint tort occurs,'
would not one defendant have a right to appeal a judgment based upon a verdict of a jury which found him
liable and exonerated a co-defendant? In other words,
If he has the right to contribution as soon as the tort
occurs, and a trial results in a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff against himself alone and in favor of his
co-defendant against the plaintiff, which judgment
is contrary to the evidence, would he not have the
right of appeal against his co-defendant? If the
Haines case (supra) and the Fox case (supra) are
sound it would seem to follow that the right of appeal
would necessarily lie between the defendants themselves in such a case. Yet the Court of Appeals has
47
held otherwise, Price v. Ryan.
There the court said: '* * * The defendant Ryan
has no standing to complain that the jury found a
verdict against himself alone. The Civil Practice Act
(211a) in furnishing to one joint tort-feasor a remedy
for the recovery of contribution from the other, expressly confines the remedy to cases where a money
judgment has proceeded against both. At common
law Ryan would have had no cause of action in contribution. Under the statute he has none, since no
judgment against his joint tort-feasor has been had.'"
We fail to see the validity of this objection. Price v.
Ryan, referred to, does not remotely touch the question at
issue. No question of contribution was involved. The sole
issue was as to whether one joint tort-feasor could urge that
a judgment against him should be reversed because judgment had gone in favor of another tort-feasor. That the
appellant has no standing on this ground is quite well settled.48 Section 211a did not afford him any refuge, because
255 N. Y. 16, 173 N. E. 907 (1930).
"Ppham v. 23rd St. Ry. Co., 48 Super. Ct. 229, aff'd 89 N. Y. 63 (1882).
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there was neither a judgment against him nor had he paid
any part of any judgment against him. The statute, therefore, had no application. In any event, it is inconceivable
that the failure of a jury to inculpate both defendants can
have any effect in a court reviewing questions of law only,
whatever might be possible in a court having power to reverse because a verdict is against the weight of evidence. It
was entirely possible that the jury decided that appellant
and the other tort-feasor were not joint tort-feasors at all,
and that therefore only one was liable.
Assuming that there is an independent obligation of
contribution between joint tort-feasors, however created,
there is no difficulty with the rule exemplified by the Haines
case, i.e., permitting a defendant tort-feasor to bring in a
joint tort-feasor as a party to the action under subdivision 2
of section 193, though it does require a rather strained construction of the concept of a "joint judgment." In this respect, the decision represents the normal reaction of a liberal
court to the harshness and discrimination of a statute which
apparently (though-under this construction-not really)
makes the right of contribution dependent on the whim of
the plaintiff. In place of that most uncertain standard,
there is, thus, created a more stable, though still uncertain,
one, i.e, the sound discretion of a court, to be exercised on
a motion to bring in a third person as a party to the action.
But the uncertainty is only as to whether relief can be had
in the same action, for otherwise, an independent action
may be commenced.
But, assuming that there is no independent obligation
of contribution, insofar as the Haines case permits the bringing in of a party, who f"will be" liable only if the motion to
implead him is granted, we are unable to experience any feeling of satisfaction, for, in this manner, the injustice is lessened only in degree. If the so-called right of contribution
is thus converted into a privilege to be dispensed as a favor
in the exercise of the discretion of a court, no matter how
sound that discretion may be, it is still an amazing statute.
The right of a defendant to receive the benefit of contribution, or the obligation of a third person to be subject to contribution, should be subject neither to the whim of a plaintiff
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nor to the discretion of any court. The right becomes less
"of a phantom nature" 48a only in degree when we substitute
judicial discretion for the "whim of a plaintiff." Rights and
obligations should depend on rules of law operating equally
with respect to all, and not varying with whatever may
happen to be the views of the particular court whose discretion is to be exercised.
Accordingly, though the decision in the Haines case, and
of those authorities follo'wing it, is quite praiseworthy as an
amelioration of what is otherwise an arbitrary statute-yet
unless indeed there has been a substantive law change,
it leaves much to be explained and fails to satisfy the inquiring mind that the true principle has been grasped, or that
C. P. A., section 211a, so interpreted and applied, is not utterly
void by reason of arbitrary and unjust discrimination.
E.
DEUTSCHER V. CAMMERANO

49

This is the only consideration of the proper construction
of section 211a of the Civil Practice Act by the Court of Appeals. The precise question decided was that a defendant
who found himself and a joint tort-feasor cast in judgment,
subsequent to the enactment of the statute, for a tort which
occurred prior to its enactment, could obtain contribution
from the joint tort-feasor thus bound by the same judgment,
because the statute was to be deemed a remedial change
and therefore retroactive.
The court said:
"The effect of this amendment as to two joint
tort-feasors who are financially responsible is the same
as if it changed the plaintiff's remedy in the collection
of a judgment by providing that each joint tortfeasor was liable only for his pro rata share of the
judgment. This would be a change in the remedy and
Fox v. Western N. Y. Motor Lines, supra note 43a.
'"256 N. Y. 328, 176 N. E. 412 (1931).
'
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affect no substantial rights, at least, create no new
ones. The same result is accomplished by the provision that if the plaintiff collects all the judgment out
of one the other must pay his share to that one" 49a
(pp. 330, 331).
This, it will be observed, is exactly contrary to the reasoning of the Appellate Division of the Fourth Department
in the Haines case, to the effect that section 211a created a
substantive right. Indeed, the same court, in TirpaeA v.
Sweet, 50 in denying a motion to bring in a joint tort-feasor
under subdivision 2 of section 193, where the tort had occurred prior to the effective date of the enactment of section
211a, did so because the statute "affects substantial rights of
tort-feasor defendants inter sese * * * rather than mere procedure." Even "the grant of a remedy where none of any
kind was available, is equivalent in substance to the creation
of a cause of action * * * 51 And the judges who dissented,
did not argue that substantial rights were not involved, but
that discretion should be exercised to permit a joint judgment thereafter to be entered, and that, therefore, "The
statute relates in this way 52 to procedure."
As applied to the facts in that case, and considering section 211a alone, the decision made in Deutscher v. Cammerano, would seem to leave little room for dispute insofar
as any claim of interference with vested rights is concerned.
Since judgment had been rendered against both defendants
(who apparently were sued as joint tort-feasors by plaintiff)
it is quite true that the statute (section 211a) diminished
rather than increased the obligation of the defendant who
had not paid any part of the judgment, in a case in which the
other defendant had paid all. As was said by Judge Crane:
"When the cause of action arose in 1925 upon
the tort claim there was no vested right in Cammerano
that the manufacturing company should pay for his
negligence contributing to the accident." 5 3
"a Ibid. at 330, 331, 176 N. E. at 412.
'231 App. Div. 353, 247 N. Y. Supp. 249 (4th Dept. 1931).
61Ibid. at 353, 354, 247 N. Y. Supp. at 249, 250.

"Ibid. italics ours.
'
Supra note 49, at 332, 176 N. E. at 413.
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But, as a general statement, torn from its context, we
doubt that it can be said that section 211a affects no substantial right, but only procedure. For, is it not quite apparent
that, assuming Cammerano had not been joined as a defendant, defendant would find his right to receive contribution
determined only by the whim of the plaintiff, or the discretion of the court to whom he addressed his motion to bring
Cammerano in as a party, and that Cammerano himself
would find that, not having been sued by plaintiff who alone
had any cause of action against him, his liability for contribution to another joint tort-feasor would depend on no rule
of law, but, rather, on the discretion of a judge, as to whether
or not he should be made a party defendant in an action
brought by plaintiff against another?
If this be not interference with vested rights-and it
seems clear that it is not-certainly it is a curious application of the equally vital provision of our fundamental law,
that there must be equal protection of the laws, for here (if
section 211a be deemed solely a procedural change, with no
concurrent substantive law change), the right of a defendant
to contribution and the obligation of a joint tort-feasor to
pay it, depends entirely on the whim of a plaintiff or the
discretion of a court.
One moment after the accident, Cammerano could not
have said what his liabilities were. He would have had to
refer the inquirer first to plaintiff, and then to the Supreme
Court at Special Term. Nor would defendant have been in a
better position. Under these circumstances, both substantive
rights and obligations are created, and no appellation or
characterization of the statute as procedural can obscure
the fact that rights are created and obligations are imposed
by a mere procedural device. Without enlarging, we conclude that any statute which predicates ultimate right to
recover or obligation to pay, as between joint tort-feasors,
not on the determination of facts on fixed and immutable
principles of law, but within the discretion of a court, as to
whether they should be applied in a particular case, lacks in
the essentials required under the law of the land.
The curious result thus follows, that the Haines case,
while highly praiseworthy as a judicial effort to eliminate
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obvious injustices created by a harsh statute, results in an
interpretation and application of it which, to us, seems quite
unconstitutional. If, therefore, section 211a be read literally,
as a procedural change, without concomitant substantive law
adjustment, it is invalid.
Nothing in any of the decisions thus far-certainly,
nothing said or considered in the latest pronouncement of the
Court of Appeals, in the Deutscher case-even touches this
criticism. The facts involved did not require its decision.
However, if it be the fact that either the Debtor and
Creditor Law, or Civil Practice Act, section 211a, has introduced the independent and general principle of contribution
between tort-feasors, then there is little difficulty with section 211a or subdivision 2 of section 193, insofar as the
substantive change in the law is concerned. But there, nevertheless, remains the problem as to whether section 211a
should properly be construed retroactively, so as to affect
torts which occurred prior to the enactment of the statute,
merely because judgment is rendered subsequent to the effective date of the statute.
To us it seems that, whatever be the view of the nature
of section 211a, i.e., whether it be considered as a procedural
or a substantive statute, it should not be retroactive to include causes of action accruing before its enactment, though
recorded in judgments entered thereafter.
Whether or not a statute is retroactive depends upon the
intention of the legislature, as gathered from the enactment.
To characterize the statute as affecting procedural, rather
than substantive law, is not necessarily to determine the
question, because such characterization, if it be of the statute as a procedural remedy, merely creates a presumption,
in the absence of express language, that the statute was
intended to be retroactive, but, like all other presumptions,
it is subject to be overcome by the facts themselves.
Even a procedural statute may be prospective, if the
legislature so intended, and this is our difficulty in following
the Deutscher case, i.e., not because it interferes with vested
rights-as to which we are quite clear, in accordance with
the opinion of the Court of Appeals, that such is not the
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fact-but because the statute itself clearly shows that it
was to be prospective only.
We have seen that section 211a was approved by the
Governor on March 18th and, yet, made effective only on
September 1st, of 1928, which seems a quite definite indication of the intention of the legislature, that it should affect
causes of action accrued or judgments entered only on and
after September 1, 1928. Otherwise, what purpose could
there have been in postponing the effective date of the statute
to September 1, 1928? Is it conceivable that the legislature
was gravely concerned that the statute should not apply to
judgments entered between March 18th and September 1st,
1928, and should only apply to judgments entered on and
after September 1st, 1928-or is it not far more reasonable
to suppose that it intended that even the judgments contemplated should only be with respect to causes of action which
accrued subsequent to September 1, 1928? If the legislature
was not willing to put C. P. A. section 211a into effect immediately, what reason is there to suppose that the statute was
intended to embrace actions already commenced?
The conclusion that it was the accrual of the cause of
action, and not merely the entry of the judgment, which was
in the mind of the legislature, is confirmed by the observation
that the Debtor and Creditor Law, which was approved by
the Governor on April 6, 1928, went into effect on that date
-yet, with the proviso that, "the provisions of this article
shall not apply to obligations arising prior to the date it
takes effect," which was April 6, 1928.r3
Reading the statutes together-as we should, if possible
-- or separately, only one result would constitute the normal
explanation, and that is that the legislature intended that in
no event should obligations accruing prior to April 6, 1928
be affected by the new Debtor and Creditor Law, and that,
even then-where the liability of a third person depended
either on the Debtor and Creditor Law, or on section 211a
(because such defendant third person had not been made
a party to the action by the plaintiff) -not unless they were
recorded in judgments entered in actions commenced on or
after September 1, 1928, irrespective of whether we regard
Supra note 6, §238.
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section 211a as a procedural or substantive supplement to
the Debtor and Creditor Law, or as an independent statute.
Under this interpretation, the Deutscher case, insofar as
it is a decision that, to construe section 211a retroactively,
does not interfere with vested rights, would be correct
enough, but, insofar as it decides that the statute should be
construed retroactively, to affect causes of action accrued
prior to September 1, 1928, it does not seem to accord with
the apparent purpose of the legislature-as found in both
the Debtor and Creditor Law, and in section 211a-to exclude prior obligations, and to project the effective date of
section 211a to a time well in the future.
CONCLUSION.

The proper construction of section 211a is, therefore,
a matter of grave doubt. It undoubtedly provides for contribution between tort judgment debtors. By expressly referring to joint judgments in "an action for a personal injury or for property damage," it leaves no room for argument upon that point. Otherwise, the reasoning of a California Court, in interpreting a statute distinguished by this feature, would apply. That court said:
"It is beyond doubt the well-established general
rule that there is no right of contribution between
joint tort-feasors. Appellant contends that this rule
has been changed by section 709 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; but we do not think so. That section does
not pretend to deal with the matter of the right of
contribution between tort-feasors. Its plain intent is
to simply provide that when there is a judgment
against itwo or more defendants who are entitled to
contribution from each other and one pays the whole
or more than his proportion thereof, 'the person so
paying or contributing is entitled to the benefit of the
judgment to enforce contribution or repayment, if
within ten days after his payment he files with the
clerk,' etc. It simply gives to a judgment-debtor entitled to contiibution the summary remedy of using
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the judgment itself to enforce the contribution, and
relieves him of the necessity of pursuing some more
tedious and inadequate proceeding for enforcing said
contribution. It is only an amendment to the law of
procedure; and the general rule is that an amendment
to or provision in the law of procedure does not change
the substantive law, unless the language used necessarily leads to that result. And it certainly cannot
be said that the legislature while enacting section 709
as a part of the law of procedure necessarily intended
to change, or did change, the fundamental principle
that there is no right of contribution between joint
tort-feasors.""5r
But, obviously, section 211a does a great deal more than
change the law of procedure, as to a joint tort-feasor not
sued by plaintiff, unless, indeed, the substantive law change
is accomplished elsewhere. The change, however accomplished, is not as arbitrary as it may appear to be, for, in
any event, the right of contribution between joint obligorseven contractual obligors--does not arise until one of them
"has paid more than his share of the original indebtedness" 5
which in actions in contract, as we have noted, is an amount
fixed by agreement, and thus readily ascertainable without
the necessity of a judgment, whereas, in tort actions, it is
only a judgment which liquidates the liability. It is, therefore, a very reasonable requirement, as fixed by section 211a,
that it is a joint judgment thereafter paid which should be
the condition precedent to apportionment, by motion in the
action. But we know of no reason whatsoever why a defendant, against whom alone a judgment for a joint tort has
been rendered and paid, should not be able to recover, in a
separate action, a pro rata share from a joint tort-feasor who
was not made a party to the action. There are instances in
which one joint tort-feasor has been permitted to sue another, to procure complete indemnity, on the ground that it
was that other who was really responsible for the tort.57
Forsythe v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 149 Calif. 569, 573, 87 Pac. 24, 25

(1906).

' Supra note 14.
7Su -ranote 3.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

There would be no greater difficulty in permitting one joint
tort-feasor, against whom alone judgment has been rendered,
to sue another in pari delicto, for contribution with respect
to the judgment which he has paid. It would be no greater
strain on the word "such" as used in the last sentence of section 211a, to interpret it as referring to the preceding word
"contribution" generally than it is upon the word "joint,"
as characterizing the type of judgment contemplated, to include a separate judgment over, of the defendant against the
impleaded third person. This would be accomplishing no
more than has been done by the Court of Appeals, in interpreting the word "such" in section 591 of the Civil Practice
Act, as referring to the thirty days allotted for a motion for
leave to appeal to that court,58 though, strictly speaking, the
time limit fixed for "such" application relates only to a
motion theretofore described for leave to appeal where there
is or has been or will be an application for a "stay pending
appeal." In the construction of statutes words do not limit
the legislative intention, but serve merely as channels through
which it is expressed. Their content may be enlarged for
that purpose even to the point of challenging literal translation.
Summarized, the following conclusions then seem quite
justified:
1. Though the Debtor and Creditor Law is properly
the repository for any and all rules of contribution between
tort-feasors, and though the intention is quite plainly manifested to include within the scope of that statute at least
the obligations, to their prospective creditors, of joint tortfeasors in pari delicto as well as of tort-feasors not in pari
delicto., it is quite doubtful-indeed, difficult-to conclude
that, as a uniform law it was intended by its draftsman to
establish the substantive rule of contribution between joint
tort-feasors. This seems so, even though much of the statute
is confused and meaningless as to joint tort-feasors, if con'Pollak v. Port Morris Bank, 257 N. Y. 287 (1931).
Illustrations are not few: (concurrent) American Historical Society v.
Glenn, 248 N. Y. 445, 162 N. E. 481 (1928) ; (fraud); People v. Mancuso, 255
N. Y. 463, 175 N. E. 177 (1931).
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tribution between them was not intended. The perplexing
character of this statute must be credited therefore to vague
and inept formulation of standards, influenced by what were
clearly the sound and desirable views of its distinguished
draftsman as to the theoretical identity of the rules which
should be applied-rather than to a deliberate and intended
attempt to make a radical change in the substantive law without expressly so stating.
2. Section 211a may, possibly, have been intended to
be based on what was mistakenly believed to be a change in
the substantive law, created by the Debtor and Creditor Law.
So construed there would certainly be eliminated all unjust
discrimination in its application, for then contribution between joint tort-feasors in pari delicto would be possible, as
in the case of joint contractual obligors, i.e., when one had
paid more than his pro rata share, with the quite reasonable
modification that, in the case of joint tort-feasors, a prior
judgment would be required to liquidate the obligation.
And, in any event, the adjustment might be made in an action
by motion, if a joint judgment had been rendered, thus dispensing with the necessity of another action, and pointing
to the desirability of the rule now prevailing, that a defendant might avail himself of subdivision 2 of section 193, to
bring in a joint tort-feasor and thus avoid circuity and multiplicity of actions. Under this view, it would be necessary
to interpret reference to "pro rata share" as contemplating
complete indemnity between tort-feasors not in pari delicto.
3. But it is far more likely, more consonant with the
language of the statute, and less disturbing to the standard
of uniform interpretation of what was intended to be a uniform law, known in our state as the Debtor and Creditor
Law, that section 211a-suggested and probably occasioned
by the adoption of the new uniform law-was intended itself
to create a substantive change in the law of contribution between joint tort-feasors in pari delicto, concurrent with and
supplementary to Article 8 of the Debtor and Creditor Law
by providing for adjustment between joint tort-feasors by
motion in the action (when the tort-feasors appeared in the
action, whether by command of plaintiff, or in the sound dis-
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cretion of a court on motion of defendant), or by separate
action, if the joint tort-feasors did not appear in the action.
This would leave the former law of indemnity between joint
tort-feasors not in par delicto just as it was. The statute
would thus be construed to liberalize, not to restrict, the
former law. It is the mischief to be remedied which should
be borne in mind.5 9 Familiar parallels occur which are quite
convincing.60 This interpretation would free the statute from
any objections of discrimination or of unequal and uncertain
application.
This would be in accord with the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the Deutscher case, which held the statute
retroactive, because relating to procedure only to the extent
that the sole objection raised and passed upon was that it
interfered with vested rights. In that case, it was quite
true that the liability of neither defendant was either enlarged or created by the statute, because the fact was that
a joint judgment had been rendered against both of them.
At the most, the statute subrogated defendant, who paid
more than his share, to the rfghts of plaintiff who had the
right, if he chose, to collect solely from the other defendant.
But as applied to an attempt to enforce contribution against
a tort-feasor who had not been joined originally as a defendant, the conclusion would inevitably be otherwise. In
such case the statute could operate only prospectively and
would create substantive rights. In such case there could
be no subrogation, since plaintiff had not enforced his right
to sue both tort-feasors. The defendant who paid the judgment would have nothing, therefore, which he could take
from plaintiff by way of statutory assignment.
If it be said that this is a rather liberal construction, it
may be said that a mysteriously drawn statute such as
0. P. A. section 211a requires it. Such is the judicial function, even to the extreme of legislating by and through the
process of interpretation when a statute such as C. P. A.,
section 211a is lanced into the void with nothing whatsoever
to explain its origin or purpose. Yet here the statute is
easily susceptible of the meaning we have given it. And
"American Historical Society v. Glenn, 248 N. Y. 445, 162 N. E. 481

(1928).

' Seibert v. Dunn, 216 N. Y. 237, 110 N. E. 447 (1915).

CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN TORT-FEASORS

that meaning removes all question of its constitutional validity and should therefore be favored."'
If the purpose is to ascertain the intention of the legislature where the expression of its will is all but obscured
from view, we need no better stated justification of what to
us seems the manifest purpose of the legislature in enacting
section 211a, than the following from the opinion of Judge
Crane in sustaining and interpreting section 1171a of the
Civil Practice Act (treating of sequestration in matrimonial
actions) which was an equally, malformed and apparently
invalid statute:
"'In construing a statute we have a right to consider conditions existing when it was adopted, and
which it must be assumed the legislature intended to
meet, and also other statutes relating to the same subject.'
'When a number of statutes, whenever passed, relate to the same thing or general subject-matter, they
are to be construed together and are in pari
materia.'11O2
Upon this standard section 211a is the substantive law
supplement to the new Joint Obligations Act contained in
Article 8 of the Debtor and Creditor Law. But whether it
was so intended, it will so inevitably develop. Experience
as reflected by judicial decision will so fuse error with virtue
that the alloy resulting will be of the strength and flexibility
of tempered steel originally poured as one. The present interpretation of subdivision 2 of C. P. A., section 193, is but
a manifestation of that process which has just begun. The
Fox case6 3 decided by the Appellate Division of the Fourth
Department is the sign post of a trail now but dimly marked,
which will inevitably take on the proportions of a road to
recognition of the substantive principle underlying Civil
Practice Act, section 211a.
JAY LEO ROTHSCHILD.

New York City.
Supra note 28.

Ibid.

Supra note 43a.

[READER'S NOTE]
AFTER this article had been fully prepared and printed,
the decision of the Court of Appeals, in Fox v. Western New
York Motor Lines, Inc. (257 N. Y. 305), published in No.
1613 of the Official Advance Sheets, dated November 28,
1931, came to hand.
This decision reverses that of the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, in 232 App. Div. 308, 249 N. Y. Supp.
623, referred to in this article. It decides that subdivision
2 of section 193 cannot be employed to bring in a co-tortfeasor, in order to make him jointly liable to the plaintiff,
with the defendant in the action, with the purpose of making
applicable the provisions of Civil Practice Act, section 211a.
The proper construction of both section 211a and subdivision 2 of section 193 is, thus, finally disposed of by the
highest court of the state, though, by reason of that construction, it is thought that the validity of section 211a, under
the equal protection of law clause of the Constitution, may
become an acute question.
This article is nevertheless printed as an expos6 of the
background of the subject and a review of its history and
problems.

